Skip to main content

Lesson 09 of 39

Core Typologies — Structuring, Shells, Nominees & Funnel Accounts

7 min read · CAMS

Define and recognize structuring (also called smurfing) and explain why it targets reporting thresholds. Distinguish a shell company from a front company, and explain how each launders value. Explain nominee arrangements and how they conceal a true beneficial owner. Recognize funnel accounts and bulk-cash smuggling as movement typologies. Practice naming a typology from a short scenario.

Cold open / hook

Picture nine deposits. Each one is nine thousand, two hundred dollars. Nine different branches, three different days, same customer. Not one of them crosses the ten-thousand-dollar reporting line. That is not a coincidence. That is a design. By the end of this lecture, you will look at that pattern and name it in one second — and you will know four more patterns just like it that the CAMS® exam loves to test.

Why typologies matter for the exam

Let me start with the word itself. A typology is just a recognized *method* of laundering money — a repeatable playbook that criminals reuse because it works. The FATF, the Financial Action Task Force, publishes typology reports that catalog these methods across the world. On Domain 1 of the exam, you are not asked to define money laundering in the abstract. You are handed a short story and asked, "What is happening here?" So your job today is pattern recognition. Five patterns. Let us build them one at a time.

Structuring, also called smurfing

The first and most heavily tested is structuring. Under the US Bank Secrecy Act, a financial institution must file a Currency Transaction Report — a CTR — for cash transactions above ten thousand dollars in a single business day. Structuring is the act of deliberately breaking a large amount of cash into smaller pieces, each one below that threshold, specifically to dodge the report.

You will also hear it called smurfing. The image is a swarm of little helpers — "smurfs" — each making small deposits so no single one trips the wire. One launderer might use ten people, ten accounts, and ten branches in one week to place a hundred thousand dollars in cash without a single CTR.

Here is the exam trap. Structuring is illegal *even if the underlying cash is clean*. Under 31 USC 5324, the crime is the evasion itself. So if a customer says, "Just keep each deposit under ten grand so you don't have to do that paperwork," that request alone is a red flag, and it can support a Suspicious Activity Report — a SAR — regardless of where the money came from.

What does structuring look like in monitoring? Multiple cash deposits just below ten thousand. Round-tripping across several branches on the same day. Deposits that suddenly stop the moment the customer learns about reporting thresholds. A business that always banks nine thousand, eight hundred — never ten thousand one.

Shell companies versus front companies

Next pattern, and this is a distinction the exam genuinely cares about: shell companies versus front companies.

A shell company is a legal entity with no real operations. No employees, no products, no storefront — just a name, a registration, and a bank account. It exists on paper. Launderers love shells because they create distance. Money flows in and out of a company that does nothing, which makes the trail hard to follow. Shells are a layering tool — they obscure ownership and movement.

A front company is different. A front is a *real, operating* business — a car wash, a restaurant, a nail salon — that genuinely sells something to genuine customers. But it is used to *mix* illicit cash into legitimate revenue. The classic version is a cash-intensive business. If your restaurant honestly earns four thousand dollars a day but you deposit nine thousand, the extra five thousand in dirty cash now looks like sales. That is integration in action.

So hold the contrast: a shell has *no* real business and hides money by being empty; a front *does* have a real business and hides money by blending it in. If a scenario describes a pizzeria that reports triple the foot traffic its location could support, think front company. If it describes a newly registered "consulting firm" with no website, no staff, and millions wired through it, think shell.

Nominees and beneficial-owner concealment

Our third pattern is the nominee. A nominee is a person — or sometimes another entity — who is named as the owner or account holder on paper, while someone else, the true beneficial owner, actually controls the money and pulls the strings.

The beneficial owner is the natural person who ultimately owns or controls the asset. Concealing that person is the whole game in a lot of laundering. A criminal puts the account in a cousin's name, a friend's name, an employee's name — or stacks shell companies in different countries so that, by the time you trace the ownership, you have hit a dead end. The nominee signs the documents; the criminal keeps the cash.

This is exactly why beneficial-ownership rules exist. The FinCEN Customer Due Diligence Rule requires covered institutions to identify the beneficial owners behind legal-entity customers, and the Corporate Transparency Act now requires many companies to report that ownership to FinCEN directly. On the exam, watch for the red flag of a customer who *refuses* to provide beneficial-ownership information, or who gives evasive answers about who really owns the company. That refusal is itself a classic indicator.

Here is your original example. A modest hairdresser opens an account "on behalf of" an overseas businessman she has never met, receives wires she cannot explain, and forwards them on within hours. She is the nominee. The businessman — invisible on the paperwork — is the beneficial owner.

Funnel accounts

Pattern four: the funnel account. A funnel account is a single account that receives many cash deposits in *one* geographic area and is quickly drained by withdrawals in a *different* area — often far away.

Think of it as a geographic pass-through. Cash goes in across several cities on the East Coast; within a day or two, it is withdrawn on the West Coast or across a border. The point is to move value across distance fast, without physically transporting the cash and without the structuring footprint sitting in one place. FinCEN has issued advisories describing funnel accounts in exactly this context — for example, in human-smuggling and drug-trafficking proceeds.

The signature to memorize: deposits and withdrawals in *different* locations, rapid movement, little or no logical business reason for the geographic split. If the activity stayed in one city, it would look like ordinary structuring. The cross-region pattern is what makes it a funnel.

Bulk-cash smuggling

Pattern five is the most physical of all: bulk-cash smuggling. This is simply the movement of large volumes of physical currency across a border to avoid the banking system entirely — cash stuffed into vehicles, luggage, hidden compartments, or shipped in cargo.

Why bother, in a digital age? Because cash leaves no electronic trail. If you can get the currency out of the country where it was earned and into a jurisdiction with weaker controls, you can place it into the financial system there with far less scrutiny. Under US law, travelers must file a report — a CMIR — when transporting more than ten thousand dollars in currency across the border. Smuggling is the deliberate failure to do that. The red flags here live at borders and shippers: currency hidden in goods, declared values that make no sense, travelers with cash amounts inconsistent with their stated purpose.

The quick-ID drill

Let us lock it in. I will give you three short scenarios. Pause, name the typology, then I will confirm.

One. A taxi company deposits sixty thousand in cash a month, but the city only licenses it for a handful of cabs and the lot is always empty. *(beat)* That is a front company — a real-looking business inflating revenue with dirty cash.

Two. A customer makes four cash deposits of ninety-five hundred dollars at four branches in a single afternoon. *(beat)* That is structuring — smurfing below the ten-thousand-dollar CTR line.

Three. An account takes in cash deposits in Texas every morning and is emptied by ATM withdrawals in Illinois every night, with no business explanation. *(beat)* That is a funnel account — geographic pass-through.

If you got those, you are reading like an analyst. The exam rewards exactly this reflex: read the story, match the pattern, name it.

Recap & next

So today we built five core typologies: structuring, where cash is split below the CTR threshold; the shell-versus-front distinction, empty entity versus blended real business; nominees, who front for a hidden beneficial owner; funnel accounts, which move value across geography; and bulk-cash smuggling, which skips the banking system altogether. Memorize the one-line signature of each, because Domain 1 questions are pattern-matching in disguise.

Next up, we go global with two methods that move enormous value with almost no paper trail: trade-based money laundering and hawala.

Sources

  • Bank Secrecy Act (31 USC §5311 et seq
  • 31 USC §5324 — structuring)
  • CTR & CMIR requirements (31 CFR Chapter X)
  • FinCEN CDD Rule (31 CFR 1010.230)
  • Corporate Transparency Act / beneficial-ownership reporting
  • FinCEN advisories on funnel accounts
  • FATF typologies reports

Ready to practice?

Put this lesson to work on real CAMS questions.

Drill the full CAMS bank →