Lesson 13 of 25
Tax Evasion, FATCA & CRS
4 min read · CFCS
Distinguish illegal evasion from lawful avoidance, see how tax crime became an ML predicate, and master FATCA reporting and the OECD Common Reporting Standard.
Evasion vs. avoidance
- Evasion — illegal; hiding income or assets
- Avoidance — using lawful means to reduce tax
- The line is intent and legality
- Tax crimes are now ML predicate offences
Start with a distinction the exam tests directly: tax evasion versus tax avoidance. Tax evasion is illegal, deliberately concealing income, inflating deductions, or hiding assets to pay less than the law requires, and it turns on intent, the willful attempt to defraud the revenue. Tax avoidance is using lawful means, legitimate deductions, structures, and incentives, to reduce the tax you owe; it may be aggressive, but it is not a crime.
The line is legality and intent, and a common distractor question dresses up ordinary avoidance to look criminal, so read the facts for concealment and deceit. Why does a financial-crime specialist care? Because, following FATF Recommendation 3, most countries now treat serious tax crimes as predicate offences for money laundering.
That means the proceeds of tax evasion are dirty money, and handling them can itself be laundering. Tax and AML are now stitched together.
How tax crime hides
- Offshore accounts and secrecy jurisdictions
- Shell companies and nominee owners
- Under-reporting income; phantom expenses
- Trade mis-invoicing shifts profits
Tax crime hides using tools you already recognize. Offshore accounts in secrecy jurisdictions conceal income from the home tax authority. Shell companies and nominee directors or shareholders obscure who really earns the money.
Domestically, evaders under-report cash income, invent phantom expenses, or run two sets of books. And in the corporate world, trade mis-invoicing, the same TBML trick from earlier, shifts profits to low-tax jurisdictions, while multinationals use transfer-pricing manipulation and earnings stripping to move taxable income across borders on paper. The leaks the world knows as the Panama and Paradise Papers exposed exactly these structures at scale, revealing how law firms and corporate-service providers industrialize them.
The lesson is that the launderer's toolkit and the tax evader's toolkit are the same toolkit, which is why one specialist can spot both.
FATCA
- U.S. law: 26 U.S.C. 1471–1474
- Foreign banks report U.S. account holders to the IRS
- Withholding penalty for non-compliant institutions
- Targets offshore evasion by U.S. taxpayers
The first big transparency weapon is the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, FATCA, codified at 26 U.S.C.
sections 1471 through 1474. FATCA requires foreign financial institutions to identify accounts held by U.S.
taxpayers, including U.S. citizens living abroad and entities with substantial U.
S. owners, and report them to the Internal Revenue Service, either directly or, more commonly, through an intergovernmental agreement with their own government. The enforcement hammer is withholding: a foreign institution that won't comply, a so-called non-participating FFI, faces a punitive thirty-percent withholding tax on certain U.
S.-source payments, an existential threat for any bank that touches dollar markets. In effect, FATCA conscripts the world's banks into reporting on American account holders, dramatically shrinking the space for offshore evasion by U.
S. persons.
The Common Reporting Standard
- OECD CRS — the global answer to FATCA
- Automatic exchange of financial account info
- 100+ participating jurisdictions, reciprocal
- U.S. uses FATCA, not CRS
FATCA was so effective that the rest of the world built its own version: the OECD's Common Reporting Standard, the CRS. Where FATCA is one country reaching outward and is reciprocal only in a limited way, the CRS is fully multilateral, more than a hundred jurisdictions automatically exchanging financial-account information about each other's tax residents on a reciprocal basis. A bank identifies the tax residency of its account holders, often by self-certification at onboarding, and reports them to its local authority, which passes the data to the relevant country.
One exam-worthy quirk: the United States did not adopt the CRS, relying on FATCA instead, which is why critics argue the U.S. has become a residual secrecy haven, taking in foreign account data through FATCA while not fully reciprocating under CRS.
Red flags and recap
- Reluctance to document tax residency or beneficial ownership
- Complex offshore structures with no business purpose
- Mismatch between activity and declared income
- Recap: evasion vs avoidance, FATCA, CRS
What should an institution watch for? Customers reluctant to document their tax residency, sign a CRS self-certification, or disclose their true beneficial ownership. Needlessly complex offshore structures with no genuine business purpose, layered holding companies in secrecy jurisdictions for a modest local business.
A sudden change of claimed tax residence to a zero-tax jurisdiction. And mismatches between a customer's apparent activity or wealth and what their tax position would suggest, the same lifestyle-versus-income logic from laundering. Because tax crimes are predicate offences, these can support a suspicious activity report.
So, recap: evasion is illegal and avoidance is lawful; serious tax crime is now an ML predicate; FATCA makes foreign banks report U.S. account holders to the IRS; and the OECD CRS extends automatic exchange worldwide, with the U.
S. standing apart on FATCA. A handy mnemonic for the exam: FATCA is the United States reaching outward toward U.
S. persons, while the CRS is the world reaching inward toward its own residents, and the U.S.
sits outside the CRS by design. Next, we enter cybercrime. Test yourself first.
Sources
- FATCA — Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (26 U.S.C. 1471–1474)
- OECD Common Reporting Standard (CRS)
- FATF Recommendation 3 (tax crimes as predicate offences)
- IRS criminal-tax enforcement
- Panama/Paradise Papers (generically)
Test your knowledge
A few CFCS questions on this material — pick an answer to see the explanation.
Q1. Under FinCEN's Customer Due Diligence Rule, which threshold triggers identification of a beneficial owner for a legal-entity customer?
Q2. The Bank Secrecy Act requires covered institutions to maintain an AML program. Which is NOT one of the four core pillars of a BSA-compliant AML program?
Q3. A bank applies exactly the same due diligence procedures to every customer — from a local pensioner with a $500 savings account to a foreign shell company managing $50 million. A regulator criticizes this approach. Why?
Q4. What is the primary purpose of a Customer Identification Program (CIP) under USA PATRIOT Act section 326?